Associated Incidents
Welcome to a special post on Memetic Warfare from Max Lesser on a pro-Russia YouTube network below.
My name is Max Lesser, and I work with Ari at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. One of my fantastic former interns, Meera, and I recently identified and investigated a network of YouTube channels that we will share here for the benefit of the research community.
A pro-Russian Youtube network operating out of Nigeria is publishing videos that have received millions of views denigrating Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and Israel. The network's content aligns with narratives often spread by Russian influence operations, which have also previously leveraged Nigerian proxies.
Coordinated Promotion of Pro-Kremlin American Voices
The network spans five Youtube channels: @Peace-Crusader, @conflictcompas, @GloryinCombat, @DaddyMaxwell77, and @freshinfoinsight. As of August 30, the channels have collectively amassed almost 37.4 thousand followers and their videos have received over 5.8 million views.
The channels display clear signs of coordination. All five have nearly-identical biographies and primarily post edited content from previous interviews by Scott Ritter and Douglas Macgregor, both known for appearing on Russian state media and pushing pro-Kremlin narratives.
Figures 1-5: Nearly-identical descriptions of the five Youtube channels in the network.
Figure 6: Latest videos from @Peace-Crusader as of August 30, 2025, showing content featuring Scott Ritter and Douglas Macgregor
The channels appear to incorporate synthetic voiceovers across all their videos. Three of them also use AI-generated news anchors in their videos, creating the impression that these feature recorded live television interviews with Macgregor and Ritter rather than repurposed footage.
The channels' videos also often have identical descriptions, frequently using identical or overlapping hashtags like #militarystrategy and #douglasmacgregorinterview.
Figure 7-9: Examples of @conflictcompas, @freshinfoinsight, and @GloryinCombat placing AI-generated news anchors alongside repurposed Scott Ritter footage
Figure 10-12: Nearly identical video descriptions from @Peace-Crusader, @conflictcompas, and @DaddyMaxwell77
Many of the channels' videos have identical titles such as "Douglas Macgregor: SURRENDERED!!!" and formulaic or identical thumbnails. We sampled titles from 200 videos, finding 65 titles were identical across 2 to 3 channels and 15 were identical across 4 to 5 channels. Repeated use of identical titles after long gaps suggests the operators use a preset list.
Figures 13-17: Screenshots of nearly-identical titles used across videos from all five channels in the network
The Identity of the Operators
All 5 channels explicitly list their location in Nigeria. 4 also expose the email of the channel's creator. By analyzing publicly listed email addresses, we found that four of the five channels appear to be operated by a small, related group of individuals based in Nigeria. We have deliberately redacted full names, emails, and social profiles due to inconclusive evidence about intent, funding, or ideological alignment.
The "More Info" section for the channel @Peace-Crusader displayed the email address [redactedemail1]@gmail[.]com, both @conflictcompas and @freshinfoinsight displayed [redactedemail2]@gmail[.]com, and @GloryinCombat displayed [redactedemail3]@gmail[.]com. Running searches for each email address on OSINT Industries revealed names, usernames, and accounts associated with each email that allowed us to identify Operator A as the owner of [redactedemail1]@gmail[.]com, Operator B as the owner of [redactedemail2]@gmail[.]com, and Operator C as the owner of [redactedemail3]@gmail[.]com. The one channel in the network that did not display an email address, @DaddyMaxwell77, also lists its location in Nigeria, supporting its inclusion in the core cluster despite the absence of direct email attribution.
Figures 18-21: Emails displayed in the "more info" section of @Peace-Crusader, @conflictcompas, @GloryinCombat, and @freshinfoinsight
We discovered that the operators, who share a last name, are likely brothers by looking at their public Facebook profiles. Specifically, a profile associated with Operator A lists Operator C as his brother. Operator C's profile then shows both Operator A and Operator B listed as brothers. We confirmed that these profiles were likely linked to the operators by triangulating account data from OSINT Industries queries. For example, Operator B and Operator C's profiles included aliases that were also used in an associated email address and linked account.
Additional Related Channels
We also identified a collection of channels that appear related but could not be attributed to Operators A, B, or C, nor connected directly to Nigeria. The extended network includes the following channels: @WORLD_INFOC, @beginyourjourneyyy, @STORYFlixx, @theunfilteredminds, @WarZoneEcho, @truepropaganda, and @CAPTAINWORLD713.
These channels produce similar content, focusing primarily on Scott Ritter and Douglas Macgregor, and follow comparable patterns in their titles, thumbnails, and descriptions. What sets them apart from the primary network is that their operators do not appear to be connected to Nigeria. In several cases, the operators seem to be based elsewhere. For example, using an associated email, we linked @beginyourjourneyyy to an individual operating out of Pakistan.
This raises the possibility that the network is broader than initially identified, potentially involving multiple operators across several countries.
Likely Proxy Network Facilitating Russian Influence Operation
The network exhibits clear indicators of coordinated inauthentic behavior, and we were able to identify the apparent operators and infer their likely relationship to each other. The operators' motivation, however, remains less clear.
One plausible explanation is that a third party contracted the operators. Operator A has publicly expressed on X his desire for employment amid financial difficulties. According to OSINT Industries, Operator A and Operator C also have accounts on Kwork, which has historically been one of the most popular freelancing websites in Russia.
Figures 22-23: Screenshots from OSINT Industries query results for [redactedemail3]@gmail[.]com and [redactedemail1]@gmail[.]com, both revealing associated Kwork accounts
Russia previously outsourced influence operations targeting the 2020 U.S. elections to Nigeria and Ghana. Considering the Kremlin's historical use of Nigerian proxies, alongside the network's consistent amplification of Kremlin-aligned narratives, the observed content and structure are consistent with patterns seen in past Russian influence operations.
An alternative explanation is that the operators are primarily financially motivated but not funded by the Kremlin. The network may seek to monetize its content by gaining high engagement or attracting paid members. Three of the five channels offer paid memberships, showing that the channels have successfully reached the threshold of engagement that enables them to monetize their channels through Youtube. However, this fact alone does not explain the exclusive focus on amplifying Kremlin-aligned narratives, nor does it rule out the possibility of third-party funding.
Figures 24-26: Paid membership options offered by @Peace-Crusader, @freshinfoinsight, and @GloryinCombat
A third explanation is that the operators are ideologically motivated to spread this content. This seems least likely, as the operators' personal, public social media channels show no clear sign of ideological alignment with Kremlin positions.
Considering the above, the most plausible explanation is that the network forms part of a Russian influence operation. However, this attribution remains inconclusive, and we invite other researchers to reach out to us with information about this network and its operators.