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インシデント 84: Tiny Changes Let False Claims About COVID-19, Voting Evade Facebook Fact Checks

概要: Avaaz, an international advocacy group, released a review of Facebook's misinformation identifying software showing that the labeling process failed to label 42% of false information posts, most surrounding COVID-19 and the 2020 USA Presidential Election.

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組織

すべての組織を表示
推定: Facebookが開発し提供したAIシステムで、Facebook users , Facebook users interested in COVID information と Facebook users interested in the US Presidential Electionに影響を与えた

インシデントのステータス

インシデントID
84
レポート数
1
インシデント発生日
2020-10-09
エディタ
Sean McGregor, Khoa Lam
Applied Taxonomies
CSETv0, CSETv1, GMF, MIT

CSETv1 分類法のクラス

分類法の詳細

Incident Number

The number of the incident in the AI Incident Database.
 

84

AI Tangible Harm Level Notes

Notes about the AI tangible harm level assessment
 

3.3 - Although there was no tangible harm, the AI was linked to the adverse outcome described in the incident.

Notes (special interest intangible harm)

Input any notes that may help explain your answers.
 

AI failed to prevent the spread of misinformation

Special Interest Intangible Harm

An assessment of whether a special interest intangible harm occurred. This assessment does not consider the context of the intangible harm, if an AI was involved, or if there is characterizable class or subgroup of harmed entities. It is also not assessing if an intangible harm occurred. It is only asking if a special interest intangible harm occurred.
 

yes

Date of Incident Year

The year in which the incident occurred. If there are multiple harms or occurrences of the incident, list the earliest. If a precise date is unavailable, but the available sources provide a basis for estimating the year, estimate. Otherwise, leave blank. Enter in the format of YYYY
 

2019

Date of Incident Month

The month in which the incident occurred. If there are multiple harms or occurrences of the incident, list the earliest. If a precise date is unavailable, but the available sources provide a basis for estimating the month, estimate. Otherwise, leave blank. Enter in the format of MM
 

10

CSETv0 分類法のクラス

分類法の詳細

Problem Nature

Indicates which, if any, of the following types of AI failure describe the incident: "Specification," i.e. the system's behavior did not align with the true intentions of its designer, operator, etc; "Robustness," i.e. the system operated unsafely because of features or changes in its environment, or in the inputs the system received; "Assurance," i.e. the system could not be adequately monitored or controlled during operation.
 

Robustness

Physical System

Where relevant, indicates whether the AI system(s) was embedded into or tightly associated with specific types of hardware.
 

Software only

Level of Autonomy

The degree to which the AI system(s) functions independently from human intervention. "High" means there is no human involved in the system action execution; "Medium" means the system generates a decision and a human oversees the resulting action; "low" means the system generates decision-support output and a human makes a decision and executes an action.
 

Medium

Nature of End User

"Expert" if users with special training or technical expertise were the ones meant to benefit from the AI system(s)’ operation; "Amateur" if the AI systems were primarily meant to benefit the general public or untrained users.
 

Amateur

Public Sector Deployment

"Yes" if the AI system(s) involved in the accident were being used by the public sector or for the administration of public goods (for example, public transportation). "No" if the system(s) were being used in the private sector or for commercial purposes (for example, a ride-sharing company), on the other.
 

No

Data Inputs

A brief description of the data that the AI system(s) used or were trained on.
 

User posts

MIT 分類法のクラス

Machine-Classified
分類法の詳細

Risk Subdomain

A further 23 subdomains create an accessible and understandable classification of hazards and harms associated with AI
 

7.3. Lack of capability or robustness

Risk Domain

The Domain Taxonomy of AI Risks classifies risks into seven AI risk domains: (1) Discrimination & toxicity, (2) Privacy & security, (3) Misinformation, (4) Malicious actors & misuse, (5) Human-computer interaction, (6) Socioeconomic & environmental harms, and (7) AI system safety, failures & limitations.
 
  1. AI system safety, failures, and limitations

Entity

Which, if any, entity is presented as the main cause of the risk
 

AI

Timing

The stage in the AI lifecycle at which the risk is presented as occurring
 

Post-deployment

Intent

Whether the risk is presented as occurring as an expected or unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal
 

Unintentional

インシデントレポート

レポートタイムライン

+1
Tiny Changes Let False Claims About COVID-19, Voting Evade Facebook Fact Checks
Tiny Changes Let False Claims About COVID-19, Voting Evade Facebook Fact Checks

Tiny Changes Let False Claims About COVID-19, Voting Evade Facebook Fact Checks

npr.org

Tiny Changes Let False Claims About COVID-19, Voting Evade Facebook Fact Checks
npr.org · 2020

Something as simple as changing the font of a message or cropping an image can be all it takes to bypass Facebook's defenses against hoaxes and lies.

A new analysis by the international advocacy group Avaaz shines light on why, despite the …

バリアント

「バリアント」は既存のAIインシデントと同じ原因要素を共有し、同様な被害を引き起こし、同じ知的システムを含んだインシデントです。バリアントは完全に独立したインシデントとしてインデックスするのではなく、データベースに最初に投稿された同様なインシデントの元にインシデントのバリエーションとして一覧します。インシデントデータベースの他の投稿タイプとは違い、バリアントではインシデントデータベース以外の根拠のレポートは要求されません。詳細についてはこの研究論文を参照してください

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