概要: 2025年6月下旬、ロシアのTelegramチャンネルで、オルハ・ステファニシナ副首相が9月1日から最大100万人のウクライナ女性を強制的に動員することを支持しているというディープフェイク動画が拡散されたと報じられた。当局はこの主張を否定し、そのような計画や法律は存在しないと確認したと報じられている。この偽情報工作は、パニックを煽り、ウクライナ国内の情勢を不安定化させることを目的としていたと報じられている。
Alleged: Deepfake technology developers と Synthetic audio generation technology developers developed an AI system deployed by Russian Telegram channels , Russian disinformation channels , Government of Russia-aligned actors , Information manipulation actors と Pro-Russian information manipulation actors, which harmed Women of Ukraine , Olha Stefanishnyna , National security and intelligence stakeholders , Government of Ukraine , General public of Ukraine , Epistemic integrity と Democratic integrity.
関与が疑われるAIシステム: Deepfake technology , Telegram , Social media platforms と Synthetic audio generation technology
インシデントのステータス
Risk Subdomain
A further 23 subdomains create an accessible and understandable classification of hazards and harms associated with AI
4.1. Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale
Risk Domain
The Domain Taxonomy of AI Risks classifies risks into seven AI risk domains: (1) Discrimination & toxicity, (2) Privacy & security, (3) Misinformation, (4) Malicious actors & misuse, (5) Human-computer interaction, (6) Socioeconomic & environmental harms, and (7) AI system safety, failures & limitations.
- Malicious Actors & Misuse
Entity
Which, if any, entity is presented as the main cause of the risk
AI
Timing
The stage in the AI lifecycle at which the risk is presented as occurring
Post-deployment
Intent
Whether the risk is presented as occurring as an expected or unexpected outcome from pursuing a goal
Intentional